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ABSTRACT
In recent years, the emerging Internet-of-Things (IoT) has
led to rising concerns about the security of networked em-
bedded devices. In this work, we focus on the adapta-
tion of Honeypots for improving the security of IoTs. Low-
interaction honeypots are used so far in the context of IoT.
Such honeypots are limited and easily detectable, and thus,
there is a need to find ways how to develop high-interaction,
reliable, IoT honeypots that will attract skilled attackers.
In this work, we propose the SIPHON architecture—a Scal-
able high-Interaction Honeypot platform for IoT devices.
Our architecture leverages IoT devices that are physically at
one location and are connected to the Internet through so-
called wormholes distributed around the world. The result-
ing architecture allows exposing few physical devices over a
large number of geographically distributed IP addresses. We
demonstrate the proposed architecture in a large scale exper-
iment with 39 wormhole instances in 16 cities in 9 countries.
Based on this setup, six physical IP cameras, one NVR and
one IP printer are presented as 85 real IoT devices on the In-
ternet, attracting a daily traffic of 700MB for a period of two
months. A preliminary analysis of the collected traffic indi-
cates that devices in some cities attracted significantly more
traffic than others (ranging from 600 000 incoming TCP
connections for the most popular destination to less than 50
000 for the least popular). We recorded over 400 brute-force
login attempts to the web-interface of our devices using a
total of 1826 distinct credentials, from which 11 attempts
were successful. Moreover, we noted login attempts to Tel-
net and SSH ports some of which used credentials found in
the recently disclosed Mirai malware.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) has gained immense pop-
ularity, creating a bridge between the physical world and
the Internet. According to the International Telecommu-
nications Union (ITU) specifications, IoT can be defined as
Internet connected physical objects or sensors which may be
called as things [3]. This implies that, unlike conventional
network nodes in the Internet such as servers or PCs, IoT
devices have a stronger link to physical reality by means
of their sensors, and their behavior relies on that interac-
tion with the analog world. During the last decade, rapid
advancement in sensor fabrication and miniaturization has
fueled the growth of the things tremendously. It is expected
that by the end of 2016, 6.4 billion things will be connected
to the Internet, growing to 11.8 billion by 2018 [5].
IoT has propelled the usage of applications such as smart
wearable devices, intelligent transportation, and industrial
automation (among others). As a large number of things
are being used or deployed commercially, it is becoming chal-
lenging to provide suitable security mechanisms. Incorrectly
configured things will provide opportunities for attackers to
perform malicious activities, ranging from sabotage of criti-
cal infrastructure to privacy violations. It is estimated that
by the year 2017, 90% of organizations that install IoT de-
vices in their premises will suffer from attacks to their back-
end IT systems, stemming from vulnerabilities in IoT de-
vices [6].
In fact, recent Distributed Denial of Service attacks on
core internet services such as DYN’s Managed DNS infras-
tructure were performed partially using IoT devices (IP cam-
eras) that had default or weak hard-coded passwords on Tel-
net and SSH interfaces [12].
Therefore, there is a strong need to develop suitable and
cost efficient methods to find vulnerabilities in IoT devices,
in order to address them before attackers take advantage of
them. In traditional IT security, Honeypots [7, 29, 30] are
commonly used to better understand the dynamic threat
landscape without exposing critical assets. Usually honey-
pots attempt to mimic a certain interaction in a realistic way
(such as a login shell), encouraging unsolicited connections
and potentially encouraging attempts to perform (possibly
unknown) attacks.
Within the context of IoT, it is challenging to realistically
mimic the interaction of IoT devices. For instance, consider
the case of IP cameras. In order to virtualize or simulate
their behaviour in a realistic way, one would need not only
to broadcast some video to an attacker, but also react faith-
fully to commands such as tilting the camera or zooming in.
Although not impossible, this requires a significant amount
of technical work that cannot be easily reused for mimicking
different types of IoT devices from different vendors, due to
the heterogeneity of such devices.
On the other hand, since IoT devices are sensing and actu-
ating on the physical world, they might have a different per-
ceived value to attackers depending on their location (e.g.,
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different organizations or countries). This is similar to the
trend seen on the botnet underground market where com-
promised servers in different regions are rented at differ-
ent prices [18]. Therefore a Honeypot exposing IoT devices
should ideally appear geographically distributed to attackers
interacting with it.
Based on the requirements mentioned above, a framework
for deploying IoT honeypots should: (1) be able to provide
high-interaction in order to motivate skilled attackers to per-
form their activity and expose the vulnerabilities they are
exploiting; (2) make it possible to easily “place” the IoT de-
vices in a wide range of geographic locations; and (3) easily
scale to devices of multiple vendors and of different kinds in
order to keep track of a dynamic threat landscape.
In this paper we propose an abstract architecture and in-
sights on a prototype implementation of such a Honeypot,
that we call SIPHON. Our implementation allows us to de-
ploy over 80 high-interactive devices with a diverse set of
IPs located in different regions of the world by using only
seven real IoT devices in our lab. We ran SIPHON for a pe-
riod of two months gathering 20GB of raw traffic data. On
doing a preliminary analysis of the data, we were able to see
that instances in different cities received significantly differ-
ent amounts of attention (in terms of connections and traf-
fic). Moreover, curious users from the Internet attempted to
brute-force the authentication of the devices, gaining access
to the admin interface and interacting with devices in some
cases.
In particular, we summarize the research problem and our
contributions as follows.
Problem Statement. IoT devices offer a rich set of poten-
tial attack vectors to the attacker. Our goal is to learn about
existing and novel attack vectors on IoT devices. In partic-
ular, in this work we focus on gathering unsolicited traffic to
IoT devices exposed to the Internet. Conventional honey-
pots use virtualization or simulation approaches to replicate
the device under attack, and attract attackers. In the con-
text of IoT, replicating the devices with virtual machines will
be challenging. Only high interaction honeypots (e.g., allow-
ing a user to move a camera) will convince skilled attackers
to use advanced attack methods while exploiting zero-day
vulnerabilities. The main question that motivates this work
is How can we construct a large scale honeypot consisting of
high-interaction IoT devices?
Approach. We propose the SIPHON architecture for scal-
able high-interaction IoT Honeypots. Our architecture uses
physical IoT devices that are connected to various geograph-
ical locations through so-called “wormholes”. The proposed
architecture was implemented in a large scale distribution
with 85 instances in 16 cities, nine countries while using
only five physical IP cameras, one NVR and one IP printer
(i.e., seven IoT devices). In our implementation, network
traffic was forwarded leveraging an infrastructure of cloud
service providers consisting of Amazon EC2 instances, Digi-
talOcean and Linode. We preliminary analyzed the collected
traffic and found insights in terms of amount of interest in
various geographical locations and types of interaction with
the devices.
Contributions. The contributions of this paper are as fol-
lows:
1. We explain the expected benefits from a high-interaction
IoT honeypot and define the design challenges.
2. We propose an architecture for a high-interactive IoT
honeypot using limited number of physical IoT devices.
3. We present an implementation of that architecture based
on seven devices presented as 85 distinct services on
the Internet.
4. We analyze captured traffic, and show that geographic
locations of our wormholes matter - attackers show
more interest in some of the locations.
We focus on high interaction distributed honeypot con-
sisting of real IoT devices. That setup allows us to capture
and analyze traffic and attacks across different geo-locations.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose and
implement such an architecture.
This work is organized as follows. The background of this
work is presented in Section 2. We propose the main archi-
tecture in Section 3, and its implementation in Section 4. We
analyze and discuss the traffic collected by our implementa-
tion in Section 5. Related work is summarized in Section 6.
Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 7.
2. BACKGROUND
A honeypot is an infrastructure commonly used to at-
tract potential attackers to a controlled and monitored en-
vironment, without exposing critical assets, with the goal
of understanding the threat landscape at a given point in
time. Usually, it may consist of real or virtual systems [30]
that mimic production environments [34]. Interactions of
the attackers with the honeypot are typically monitored and
recorded for further analysis. Researchers can then design
appropriate mitigation techniques for attacks after analyz-
ing the traces collected by the honeypot. From the point of
intrusion analysts, “honeypots provide another indication of
wave of network attacks” [35].
Honeypots may be set up in such a manner that they
will provide convincing fake information which may be de-
sirable to potential attackers, in order to attract their in-
terest. Also, honeypots can help to redirect attackers to
a decoy system and thus indirectly protect critical systems
or infrastructure from a possible compromise: if attackers
are misled to think they are interacting with a real system,
they are wasting time and resources to cause damage to real
infrastructures.
Security researchers classify honeypots as either high-inte-
raction or low-interaction in accordance with the privileges
enjoyed by the attackers and real vulnerabilities being ex-
posed to them. In the following we briefly recap these two
categories.
2.1 Low interaction honeypots
Low-interaction honeypots emulate well-known vulnerable
network services by partially implementing the TCP and IP
stacks, in order to attract attackers. They do not give an
attacker access to a real system, but rather to some sort of
emulated system [13]. Since usually they do not run a fully
featured operating system, they are considered to be safer
in terms of remote exploitation. However, due to their sim-
plicity, the main disadvantage of low-interaction honeypots
is the higher likelihood of being detected as artificial by the
attacker, especially if the attacker is a human. The attacker
may find that the real services are emulated and services
are only partially implemented, and thus lose interest. Low-
interaction honeypots are by construction not optimal to
capture zero-day vulnerabilities, since by their nature such
vulnerabilities are unknown at the time of the deployment
of the honeypot, and thus cannot be simulated [31]. Low
interaction honeypots can be used to detect a new wave of
attack for a very limited time until the honeypot is labeled
as such by attackers and dedicated search engines.
2.2 High interaction honeypots
High interaction honeypots help to observe attacks in a
more realistic setting than low-interaction honeypots. They
do not emulate any services, functionalities, or base oper-
ating systems. They thus allow to learn more about the
tools, tactics, and motives of the attacker, because they do
not restrict the attacker’s behavior in the way that a low-
interaction honeypot would [31]. As a result, high inter-
action honeypots are better suited to monitoring complex
interactions between the attackers and the system [13].
On the other hand, according to [13], there are disadvan-
tages to high-interaction honeypots. First they are usually
difficult and costly to deploy and maintain. Also they pose
a higher security risk, since attackers can stop normal op-
eration of the device after scaling their privileges and may
use the device at their will. If one is interested in exposing
many vulnerabilities that might depend on different hard-
ware/software configurations (like various OS versions etc.),
a large heterogeneous deployment of real devices is required.
Last, although high-interaction honeypots cater for monitor-
ing a wide range of events (such as network traffic and host-
based activity such as system calls), this usually results in
a large number of logs, making security analysis more chal-
lenging.
2.3 Wormholes
In the context of wireless communications, the term worm-
hole refers to malicious forwarding of communication by the
attacker [21], often through an out-of-band channel. In par-
ticular, wormholes can be used to influence routing schemes
in dynamic sensor networks [20], or to attack wireless key
schemes for cars [14]. Wormholes are typically very chal-
lenging or impossible to detect [19].
In this work, we will use the term wormhole in a novel,
but related way. Instead of offensive wormholes used by an
attacker, our wormholes are defensively used by the honey-
pot operator. To the attacker, the presence of the wormhole
(and in particular the location of the other end) should be
transparent. We discuss how to achieve that in Section 3.
2.4 Shodan
Shodan [10] is a search engine that lists IoT devices found
on the internet, including Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
devices such as Programmable Logical Controllers (PLCs)
and household devices such as IP cameras among others.
Figure 1 shows a device in our Honeypot found on Shodan
that corresponds to the search for cameras in a specific lo-
cation.
Shodan uses port scanning on internet IPs and analyzes
the obtained responses to identify the type of device found.
In average, it takes 1 to 2 weeks for a newly deployed device
to be listed by Shodan [10].
In the following, our hypothesis is that Shodan will be
used as the primary source of information on potential tar-
gets by attackers. Moreover, the Shodan API provides a
service that tries to estimate if a device exposed by Shodan
is a Honeypot or not. This service is called Honeyscore1,
which is also accessible from the developer’s command line
interface API of Shodan. The Honeyscore uses a heuristic
to classify devices as potential honeypots, giving a score be-
tween 0 (likely not a honeypot) and 1 (likely a honeypot).
Figure 1: Example of a camera listed on Shodan (in
this case, one of our wormholes).
3. SIPHON: A SCALABLE HIGH-INTERAC-
TION PHYSICAL HONEYPOT
In this section, we present our design for SIPHON: a Scal-
able high-Interaction Physical HONeypot. We start by out-
lining our attacker and system model, and then present the
abstract system design.
3.1 Problem Statement
Our goal is to learn about existing and novel attack vec-
tors for IoT devices. In particular we want to use the wisdom
of the crowd of attackers in order to learn about the exis-
tence of vulnerabilities that are commonly exploited. In this
work we focus on gathering unsolicited traffic to IoT devices
exposed to the Internet. Conventional honeypots use vir-
tualization or simulation approaches to replicate the device
under attack, and attract attackers. In the context of IoT,
replicating the devices with virtual machines will be chal-
lenging. Only high interaction honeypots (e.g., those allow-
ing the user to move cameras) will allow to convince skilled
attackers to use advanced attacks. The main question that
motivates this work is How can we construct a large scale
honeypot consisting of a limited number of real IoT devices?
3.2 Design Considerations
In the following, we assume that attackers are using the
Internet (and in particular Shodan [25]) to identify poten-
tially vulnerable or unsecured IoT devices such as webcams,
smart fridges or similar. Typically, the attacker starts with
a reconnaissance phase, followed by an exploit phase. The
attacker could use either automated tools or manual inter-
action for either of those phases.
The devices under attack are assumed to be reachable
from the Internet directly (i.e. on public IP addresses).
They will expose one or more services on open ports. Such
services could be HTTP, telnet, SSH, or a more specific pro-
tocol such as RTSP. The devices will be embedded in a real
1https://honeyscore.shodan.io/
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Figure 2: Abstract overview of distributed physical
honeypot
environment, i.e. the cameras will show live images, the
fridge will contain real food, etc. Devices will be configured
with minimal effort (i.e. potentially with default passwords).
No dedicated security solutions are present (such as firewalls
or IDS). If the devices are reachable through a NAT service,
then the exposed services are forwarded by the NAT.
3.3 Design Overview
Our design (see Figure 2) is based on real physical IoT
devices, that are exposed to the Internet through a large
number of tunnels that forward traffic from wormholes (re-
mote public IP addresses) to the local physical IoT devices.
Wormhole. The wormhole device presents a number of
open ports to the general Internet on a public IP address.
Incoming traffic on those ports is either logged locally, or
transparently forwarded to a specific port on a remote physi-
cal IoT device via the Forwarder device. There are a number
of options on how this forwarding can be achieved, we dis-
cuss them in Section 3.5. More than one physical device can
be associated to each wormhole, but each service forwarded
will need a unique port on the wormhole.
Forwarder. The forwarder ensures that the traffic between
the wormhole and the IoT device is re-written in real-time
to hide the fact that devices are physically located some-
where else, or communicating with many other tunnels. If
required, the forwarder can also act as a TLS man-in-the-
middle because it will have access to the private keys of
certificates used by the IoT devices.
Device under Attack (DUA). The local (IoT) device
under attack in the SIPHON architecture can be a normal
commercial off-the shelf device. It will expose one or more
services via the network, most likely over TCP. The device
is able to maintain a number of concurrent connections at
any point in time.
Storage & Analysis Unit (SAU). The SAU obtains traf-
fic records and general logs from the wormholes, and aggre-
gates the data for offline analysis. For example, the recorded
traffic can be analyzed by a suitable framework (e.g. Suri-
cata or Snort [8]). In addition, dedicated analysis frame-
works for other honeypot deployments could be used (similar
to [27]).
3.4 Location of Wormholes
As IoT devices are embedded in the physical world and
interact with it, our hypothesis is that the physical location
of the device under attack is correlated to its attractive-
ness to the attacker. While the direct physical location of a
communication partner on the Internet is not easy to deter-
mine [9], many services on the web provide IP geolocation
services (e.g., [17]).
For that reason, we propose to ensure that the worm-
holes have public IP addresses that are localized in a range
of physical locations, ideally spanning multiple countries or
even continents.
That goal can be achieved in a number of ways. While
nowadays the IPv4 address space is becoming scarce [32],
the easiest way to obtain public IP addresses seems to be
a) home users (who often get one IP per subscription line),
and b) servers on the cloud (cloud providers own large IPv4
address spaces). In this work, we focus on the latter (see
Section 4). To take advantage of public IP addresses of
home users, we also considered preparing devices such as
Raspberry PIs with a specific configuration as wormhole to
forward traffic to the honeypot forwarder. The disadvantage
of that approach is the fact that such home setups would
likely require the home user to set up port forwarding on the
home NAT device (often called router in that context). That
configuration effort might be non-trivial for many users, and
thus we have not followed this implementation path.
3.5 Forwarding Method
The tunnels between the forwarder and the wormholes can
be realized using a range of different forwarding techniques.
We now discuss a number of options that we considered.
Application-Layer Proxy. If the honeypot should repre-
sent only few selected services, it would be possible to use
proxies on the wormholes for those services (E.g., an HTTP
proxy like mitmproxy). There are a number of advantages
of that approach, for example the option to cache static in-
formation and thus reduce the traffic load on the DUAs.
Encapsulation. On the transport and application layers,
services such as SSH and TLS can be used to encapsulate
selected traffic with low configuration overhead. In our im-
plementation, we chose an SSH tunnel as method to forward
the traffic.
Network-Layer VPN. A number of network-layer VPN
services are available (e.g., IPSec), a detailed comparison
of which is out of scope here (we refer to [23]). Such ser-
vices might have an advantage over selective forwarding us-
ing SSH, as large numbers of ports could be forwarded with
little configuration.
3.6 Compromise Detection and Restoration
As the SIPHON architecture exposes real devices to the
attacker, it is possible for the attacker to fully compromise a
device as part of an attack. Once compromised, the devices
could be used to attack other devices, the general neighbor-
ing infrastructure, or distribute malware to other attackers.
There are several options to mitigate or prevent such sce-
narios.
Periodic Reset. A simplistic approach to mitigate the
impact of compromised devices would be a setup that pe-
riodically resets the configuration and firmware of all IoT
devices that are used in the lab. That approach has sev-
eral disadvantages (i.e. timeliness, completeness of reset).
On the other hand, it is easy to set up with some manual
intervention.
IPS. Intrusion prevention systems like the open source Suri-
cata [8] could be used together with custom rules tailored
towards the IoT devices to prevent their ongoing compro-
mise. In addition, an IDS/IPS could be used to detect the
changed behavior of a compromised device to identify that
such a compromise has happened.
Full instrumentation. The most reliable detection of a
compromise could be achieved through low-level instrumen-
tation of the IoT devices, e.g. through JTAG or similar
connections. The setup and maintenance of such instru-
mentation is possible, but expected to be challenging and
expensive [16].
3.7 Scalability
As we claim in the acronym SIPHON, the proposed ar-
chitecture should be scalable. Our intuition for that is as
follows: for n physical IoT devices and m wormholes, the
number of devices presented to the attacker, without expos-
ing the same device twice in the same wormhole, can be
up to n ∗ m. For instance, if n = 100 and m = 1000 up
to 100,000 services could be exposed to the Internet. The
number of services per wormhole is limited to around 65,000
due to port numbering restrictions. The number of worm-
holes per physical device is limited by the amount of parallel
traffic that can be handled by each physical device. In our
practical implementation, we chose lower values for both n
and m due to budget and space constraints as we will discuss
in the following.
4. A DISTRIBUTED IP-CAMERA HONEY-
POT
In this section, we discuss an implementation of the pro-
posed SIPHON architecture for a specific class of IoT de-
vices: IP cameras used for home or public surveillance. We
chose that class of devices as the number of IP cameras con-
nected to the Internet is increasing daily, and recent research
findings have shown that the IP cameras and Network Video
Recorder (NVR) are vulnerable to attacks [12, 27],thus at-
tracting more unsolicited traffic than other IoT devices in
the market. In addition, IP cameras allow access to private
video, and often allow complex interactions with the user
(e.g. manual movement control).
In our implementation, locations of the cameras are spoofed
using wormholes based on instances in cloud services. The
instances are deployed in different cities around the world.
From the perspective of the attacker, the cameras are lo-
cated across cities (e.g., by using the location feature of
search engines such as Shodan). All traffic is directed from
the wormholes to our lab for in-depth analysis.
4.1 Implementation
Figure 3 shows our prototype infrastructure for the SIPHON
deployment with IP cameras and a networked video recorder
(NVR). Table 1 shows the list of devices used.
By default, all the devices expose an administration web
interface protected by a password. In order to attract com-
plex interactions with the devices, we use default passwords
for some of the cameras while we use weak passwords for
others. A screenshot of one of the HTTP interfaces of the
cameras after successful authentication is shown in Figure 4.
Using the administration web interfaces aligns well with
our goal of capturing high interaction traffic. They provide
apt opportunities to expose to the attacker, multiple device
interaction scenarios, such as camera motion, wi-fi network
scanning, etc. Even though more recent attacks, like the
one using Mirai malware, rely completely on the discovery
and exploitation of vulnerabilities via the Telnet and SSH
Device Model Password Difficulty
HP Pro Printer 6830 1234567890 Easy
D-Link DCS-9050 password123 Easy
D-Link DCS-930L YAQvwrjy Hard
D-Link DCS-942L 1234567890 Easy
Aztech WIPC409HD admin Default
Sineoji PT603V 9WgnTMxe Hard
Trendnet Emulator admin Easy
HikVision NVR
7604NI-E1/4P
xDk2PKHU Hard
Table 1: IoT Device Details
ports [26], we do not actively seek information on attacks
made on these ports. This is due to the following reasons:
1) Telnet/SSH would not provide a high-interaction environ-
ment as an environment that enables video transmission via
HTTP and therefore would be less interesting 2) Telnet/SSH
was already explored in this context by IoTPOT [27] 3) None
of the IoT devices used by us have open Telnet or SSH ports
Figure 4: Example of device view through a worm-
hole
The devices in our lab were connected to cloud servers
from three different cloud service providers (viz. Amazon,
LiNode and Digital Ocean) in various cities. During our ex-
periment, a total of thirty nine servers were deployed and
each of them had a distinct public static IP. Each of the cloud
servers was designated as a wormhole with up to three (3)
connected devices. The devices were connected on different
ports of the cloud server. In total, 85 devices were visible
to the attackers on the Internet, while only eight physical
devices were used, thereby yielding in average about 10 pos-
sible virtual connections to each physical device. Shodan
obtained the information about the devices using device fin-
gerprinting heuristics such as parsing the HTTP response of
the device and published the devices along with their geo-
locations, accessible ports and other useful information as
illustrated in Figure 1.
Eventually, all the traffic (i.e. device solicitations or at-
tacks) was being diverted to the IP cameras or Network
Video Recorders (NVR) in our lab. All traffic was captured
using tcpdump on each of the wormhole servers and the re-
sulting traces (in .pcap format) were stored locally for offline
analysis.
4.2 Technical Setup for Traffic Forwarding
  
Analysis Unit
Forwarder
Storage Unit
Devices under attack
Rsync
SSH
Tunnel
Example of completed virtual link
Public Network
Internet
Periodic connections
Permanent connections
Figure 3: SIPHON prototype implementation in our lab
Figure 5: Setup of Cameras and NVR in Lab.
Our technical setup relies on a network gateway scheme,
as described abstractly in Figure 2. To implement the for-
warder, we used a local server in our lab which manages the
TCP connections from the wormhole instances in the cloud.
This server alone handles all m wormhole to n IoT devices
communications. The server itself is a VM guest with 1
virtual core and 4GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 16.04.
The connection between the forwarder and the cloud in-
stances is established with reverse ssh tunnels that redirect
traffic of a specific port (i.e. port 80) on the wormhole to
a port in the forwarder. Once the traffic has reached the
forwarder, we complete the traffic redirection to the IoT de-
vices by means of the socat linux command, which also for-
wards the device’s responses to the cloud instance through
the forwarder. This process is easy to automatize by using
a different local port in the forwarder for each cloud replica
of a physical device (wormhole).
The IoT devices are isolated from other devices in the lab
through the use of 802.1Q VLANs. That ensures that even
compromised devices can at most interact with other IoT
devices, and the server.
4.3 Locations of Wormholes
For the attackers, the IoT devices are placed in the cities
where the actual wormhole is placed. Physically, the IoT
devices can be located in a common area together with the
forwarder.
Figure 6 shows the locations of honeypot deployment in
various cities in different continents around the world. The
SIPHON experimental deployment covered the following 16
cities in 9 different countries: a) USA (San Jose, Board-
man, Ashburn, New York, San Francisco, Dallas, Fremont,
Newark) b) Canada (Toronto) c) Europe (Frankfurt, Lon-
don, Dublin, Amsterdam) d) Asia (Singapore, Bangalore) e)
Australia (Sydney).
Figure 6: Prototype wormhole locations in cities
around the world.
This setup had a total cost (for 39 wormhole instances at
three different providers) of about 12 USD per day. We note
that the smallest instance sizes are usually sufficient for the
setup, which allows to keep the cost low.
4.4 Hiding the honeypot character
The literature [31] defines different detection methods de-
ployed by attackers to detect the existence of honeypots.
Such methods usually vary depending on the tool used to
create the honeypot. For e.g. a honeypot created using the
tool ‘Nepenthes’ can be detected using NMap (a network
open port mapping tool). NMap is able to identify the ver-
sion of only one service amongst multiple services that are
running on a Nepenthes machine. On the other hand, a
honeypot created using ‘Sebek’ can be detected by discover-
ing the memory addresses of the system calls ‘sys read’ and
‘sys write’ and ensuring that they are not more than 4096
bytes apart from each other. Usually, low interaction honey-
pots use tools that partially mimic network stacks (TCP/IP)
to attract attackers by exposing vulnerable services. Such
network stacks may be susceptible to well crafted packets
thereby revealing the existence of a honeypot. Also, by their
very nature honeypots built using virtual machines are sub-
ject to timing attacks. For e.g. the timestamp in TCP
packets over different virtual machines hosted in the same
physical machine can exhibit a similar skew over a period
of time in contrast to the same setup over different physical
machines [31].
Although we have not yet fully explored ad-hoc attacks
against our infrastructure, after running our distributed hon-
eypot for a while, we checked whether its IP addresses are
marked as “honeypot” by Shodan. During the experiment
run, our IP addresses were mostly not detected as honeypot
by Shodan (see Figure 1), in particular the score we get from
Honeyscore through the Shodan’s developer API ranges in
most cases from 0.0 to 0.5 (not honeypot), with an average
score of 0.16 and only one instance was labelled as a Honey-
pot with confidence 0.8. The exact method how Shodan is
detecting honeypots is unknown to us, but most likely it is a
heuristic based on well-known open source honeypot tools.
5. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF TRAFFIC
In this section, we present the results of our analysis of
the traffic captured by our prototype. In particular, we fo-
cus on the following aspects: a) whether the location of the
wormhole matters to the attacker, b) whether some devices
were more attractive to attackers than others c) whether be-
ing listed in Shodan had an impact in terms of unsolicited
connections d) whether attackers would show different be-
haviour when interacting with a low-interaction version of
our setup and e) the kind of interactions between the at-
tacker and the devices.
5.1 Analysis Goals
Interests of attackers may vary depending on several fac-
tors as discussed above. In this work, the following hypothe-
ses have been considered in this regard.
Location. We conjectured that attackers prefer to invest
more time in certain cities to ascertain their targets than
others. They search for devices in a particular city of their
interest and initiate interactions subsequently. This can be
motivated for instance by a commercial interest of the loca-
tion’s IP for re-selling after infection (such as in the case of
botnets [18]), or as a starting point for targeted attacks.
Device type. We assumed that attackers target particu-
lar models or device types that might have known vulner-
abilities. For example, attackers may particularly look for
vulnerable IP cameras.
Shodan Listing. We speculated that attackers may target
devices more after they get listed on Shodan. We look for
differences in the connection attempts before and after a
device gets listed on Shodan.
High-interaction vs. Low-interaction. We conjecture
that attackers might behave differently when exposed to a
low interaction implementation of our devices, for instance a
camera administration web-service that has an identical look
and feel as the original, but shows a static image instead of
video.
In order to validate the points above, we take into ac-
count the following interaction factors. First, we want to
understand how many TCP connections we are receiving
per wormhole, and what kind of services are being consulted
(SSH, our HTTP ports etc.) This already sheds light on how
many wormholes have been discovered and how much atten-
tion do they receive.
Next we are interested in understanding whether such
interactions are being performed using well-known scripts
based on the number of connections received per wormhole
in short time frames, the number of different ports accessed
by the same wormhole, as well as the user agent in HTTP
sessions (for example, in the collected traffic we identified the
masscan agent [2]). Moreover, since to have access to our
devices’ admin interface an attacker needs to authenticate,
we are interested in counting brute-force login attempts, to
count how many of those have been successful, and to fur-
ther investigate what happens after a successful login.
To further evaluate attacker attempts to gain access to our
devices, we have assigned default, easy and hard passwords
(Table 1). We can then, by analysing the HTTP responses
issued after successful login, gather statistics on movements
or zoom-ins on the cameras, scanning for WiFi networks (a
feature often offered in the admin interfaces of IP cameras)
and more interestingly, firmware updates.
5.2 High-interaction IP camera honeypot
All the network traffic is collected and stored on a local
machine in our lab. We store the raw pcaps obtained with
tcpdump, and then in order to perform the aforementioned
analysis, we parse the pcaps and store the basic features of
each TCP connection in an SQL database.
Distinct remote IPs. Upon analyzing the more than two
months’ worth of data, we observed incoming TCP connec-
tions from over 13000 distinct remote IP addresses.
Connections to wormhole per city. Based on the ge-
ographical distribution of our wormholes, we observed that
wormholes in some cities received more attention than worm-
holes in other cities. Figure 7 depicts the distribution of
incoming TCP connections received by wormholes per city.
The wormhole(s) in Frankfurt received the most connections
(almost 600 000), while San Jose in US received the least
number of connections (about 50 000).
Wormhole ports. However, we observed that most of the
incoming connections (about 97%) were on port 22 (SSH) of
the wormholes, whereas HTTP ports like port 80 and port
8080 received just 1.27% and 1.12% of total connections re-
spectively. Other HTTP ports which we had opened got a
mere 0.25% of the total incoming TCP connections. Fig-
ure 8 shows the distribution of incoming TCP connections
according to the wormhole ports.
Figure 7: Distribution of TCP connections to worm-
holes according to their city
Figure 8: Connections to ports of wormholes
Location of attackers. Although not a reliable indica-
tor (since attackers can easily tunnel through IPs located
anywhere in the world), we also gathered statistics on the
location of remote IPs. We analyzed the origin of all the
incoming connections by country. Figure 9 shows the dis-
tribution of incoming TCP connections by their countries
of origin. We saw that more than 70% of the connections
originated in China followed by 8% connections originating
in USA. Netherlands, France and other countries make up
the remaining list as shown in Figure 9.
User-agents used by attackers. Next, we enumerated
the agents being used in the connections to our devices. In
Figure 10, usage of different user agents in incoming TCP
connections has been shown. Most of the connections (76%)
were made using Mozilla as the user agent. Apart from
this, Chrome, Python Request, Wget(linux), Curl, Scanbot,
Telesphoreo and Masscan [2] agents were used. Other user
agents were combined together into the ‘Others’ category
that contributed 2.8% of the total connections and included
IP Camera Viewer, Cam Finder, Morfeus F Scanner, Msqq
agents, etc. Usage of Nmap was detected several times. To
top this, we also noticed around 9000 Shell shock attempts
on our devices.
Attacked devices. In Figure 11, we depict the combined
amount of interest generated (based on HTTP traffic only)
by the different physical devices. We observe that the ma-
jority of traffic was directed towards the DLink DCS-930L
camera. We conjecture that this device attracted the most
Figure 9: Incoming connections according to their
country of origin
Figure 10: Incoming connections according to user
agents
attention from attackers due to a recent report in the media
about the presence of vulnerabilities in its firmware [1].
Brute force login attempts. We have setup the IoT de-
vices with different levels of password difficulties (Table 1).
We retained the default credentials for the web interface lo-
gin on some, while we modified the credentials on others.
We configured some cameras to have easy to guess pass-
words, whereas others were configured with hard to guess
passwords. With this setup, we observed 404 brute force at-
tempts on all the devices combined from 137 distinct remote
IPs. We deem a login attempt as a brute force attempt if
the same remote IP tries to perform more than three login
attempts in an HTTP session. Of these 404 brute force at-
tempts, we observed a total of 11 attempts succeed. All the
successful login attempts were on devices with easy pass-
words, and no login was recorded on a device with a hard
password. We note that these easy passwords are present
in most of the dictionaries used by automated brute-force
attacks. On the other hand, these passwords can be guessed
or brute forced easily even when attacking manually.
Impact of device listing on Shodan
Another goal of this analysis was to investigate the impact of
the listing of a wormhole on Shodan. We tried to understand
this by computing the number of TCP connections received
by wormholes before and after their Shodan listings. Shodan
Figure 11: Traffic breakup for the devices
usually takes between one-two weeks to enlist an IP after it
becomes live on the Internet. With respect to this, we took
into consideration one week’s worth of incoming connections
before and after Shodan listing.
Figure 12: Impact of Shodan listing on no. of in-
coming connections
In Figure 12, we show the combined impact of Shodan
listing for all wormholes. In particular, we show how many
average connections the wormholes attracted per week, be-
fore and after the listing. In Figure 12, the top bar represents
the average number of connections across all the wormholes
before they get listed on Shodan. The bar in the middle rep-
resents the average number of connections during the first
week after getting listed on Shodan, while the bottom bar
represents the average number of connections during the first
two weeks after getting listed on Shodan. A surge in incom-
ing connections is evident after listing on Shodan. We also
observed that this surge in connections continues even in the
second week after Shodan listing, but is reduced in increase.
Thus, we can infer that there is an immediate impact of the
Shodan listing, and attackers try to compromise the devices
immediately after listing on Shodan. In the long term, the
number of incoming connections decreases.
5.3 Other IoT devices
So far, we have used only IP-cameras and an NVR in the
high interaction honeypot and gained knowledge about the
attackers’ behavior/interaction with them. But these de-
vices do not represent the entire spectrum of existing IoT
devices. We are interested in garnering knowledge about at-
tackers’ behavior towards other IoT devices as well. There-
fore, we added another IoT device, the IP printer, to our
honeypot, for about four weeks. This IoT device was con-
nected to a cloud instance of Digital Ocean and located in
London. Thus, similar to the IP cameras, even though the
device was physically present in our lab, it appeared to be
located in London.
After analyzing four weeks’ worth of network traffic data
from the IP printer, we present our results.
Wormhole ports. We observed that most of the con-
nections (99%) were on port 22 (SSH) of the wormholes,
whereas port 80 (HTTP) received a meager 1%. Even in the
case of IP cameras, we observed that the SSH port received
more number of connections compared to HTTP ports.
Location of attackers. Similar to the observation in the
case of IP cameras, we noticed that the highest percentage
of incoming connections to the IP printer (79%), originated
in China. Taiwan was next with 11% of connections origi-
nating in Taiwan. France, India, Kazakhstan, Netherlands,
Ukraine and USA made up the remaining portions.
Brute force login attempts. We had changed the cre-
dentials of the IP printer to a password that should be easy
to guess (admin:1234567890 ). During our experiment, we
observed only one brute force login attempt. Similar to the
case of IP cameras, we deem a login attempt as a brute force
attempt if the same remote IP tries to perform more than
three login attempts in an HTTP session. A total of four
successful login attempts were noted, from three distinct re-
mote IPs, all from China.
User-agents used by attackers. Similar to the case of IP
cameras, we tried to understand which different user-agents
were used in the connections to IP printer. We observed that
all the four successful login attempts were made using the
Mozilla user-agent. Unlike in the case of IP cameras, we did
not notice a few user-agents (viz. cameraviewer, IPcamera
finder, Scanbot, Morfeus F scanner, Msqq etc.). In addition,
we did not notice any Shell shock attempts on the IP printer
either.
5.4 Low interaction honeypot
One of our hypothesis for the low interaction honeypot
is that most of the attacks are executed in an automated
manner using bots. We assume that these bots are not ca-
pable to distinguish between real and virtual or fake devices.
So, these bots may conduct repeated attempts considering
the device as a real one. In contrast, a human being will
discover a fake device and will not make repeated attempts
consequently.
We have implemented a low interaction honeypot using
the same methodologies as of the high interaction one. How-
ever, instead of a real physical device, we used the Trendnet
camera emulator in the low interaction honeypot. Hence,
this camera is a fake camera and not a real one. The entry
point (i.e. wormhole) to the low interaction honeypot has
been created using an instance from cloud service provider
Linode, located in Singapore. Thereafter, we gathered data
from the low interaction honeypot for almost six weeks.
The results from six weeks of data are now presented.
Wormhole ports. We observed that most of the connec-
tions to the fake camera i.e. Trendnet camera emulator
(87%) were on port 22 (SSH) whereas HTTP Ports 8080
and 80 received 12% and 1% of the total incoming connec-
tions respectively . In that respect, the behavior seen is
consistent with the trends observed with the high interac-
tion honeypots.
User-agents used by attackers. Similar to the corre-
sponding observation in the case of high interaction hon-
eypot, we observed the maximum percentage of incoming
connections to be having the user-agent as various versions
of Mozilla. Apart from that, the attackers also used WGET
(Linux), python, masscan and Probethenet Scanner. All
these user agents were observed in the high interaction hon-
eypot as well.
Login attempts. We have noted three successful login at-
tempts with the default credentials admin:admin from three
distinct remote IPs. One successful login attempt was made
each from China, Russia and Iran.
We also observed that the attackers did not spend enough
time to explore the device or its functionality. They spent
on an average only around 30 seconds in the low interac-
tion honeypot, compared to about one minute or even up
to an hour in the case of real cameras. The time spent by
the attacker exploring the device is calculated based on the
timestamps of the first and last packets in the TCP session
captured via tcpdump. It is understood that the duration
of a session is correlated to human intervention. session
time will be longer when the attacker will try to explore
functionality of the device. Human beings can easily dis-
tinguish between a still image and a streaming video unlike
automated bots. Thus, we can more easily determine man-
ual attacks using this low interaction honeypot compared to
our earlier high interaction honeypot.
5.5 Discussion and comments on validity
By analyzing the traffic, we see that our proposed archi-
tecture was successful in attracting a high number of con-
nections, which confirms our overall design. In addition, we
were able to observe interesting interactions in our prelim-
inary analysis of the gathered data. We note that in our
analysis, we assume that interaction between the attacker
and IoT device over HTTP is more likely performed by hu-
mans than scripts, since interaction with unknown HTTP
interfaces is harder to automate [27]. Our prototype is thus
a promising first step towards effectively learning the threat
landscape in IoT security.
We are aware of several issues with our current prototype.
First, one might argue that an intelligent attacker can spot
our honeypot in different ways. For example, the attacker
can detect that two wormholes represent the same physical
device by simultaneously logging in to the same devices from
two different wormholes. We acknowledge this shortcoming,
but note that during our experiment, our data indicates that
at least no single IP has discovered all the wormholes and the
majority only interacted with a small subset (typically 5 or
less). The issue can also be mitigated by having one different
physical device per wormhole. Since we were interested in
comparing different locations, we decided to scale the system
in a 1 to n fashion instead of a bijective relation between
devices and wormholes.
Compared to related work such as [27], we have so far ob-
served very few attempts to upgrade the firmware, which is
a very common objective of attackers who want to spread
botnets or malware. We conjecture a possible explanation
for this as follows. We have noticed that only the minority of
traffic in the wormholes was directed to the ports exposing
the web interface of our IoT devices. Attackers seemed much
more interested in SSH connections, possibly because com-
mon automated attack tools are tailored to re-flash firmware
using a shell, which is a general approach that works in many
devices. We believe that the firmware upgrade attempts we
received were performed manually, but we also think such
attacks will increase in the future as attack tools automa-
tize this process for different brands. It is also likely that
in the future access to SSH ports on many devices such as
home-cameras will be more restricted, whereas access to the
web-interface might be still desirable for convenience of ac-
cess.
Additionally, one might argue that an IoT device con-
nected to the Internet through an IP that is owned by Ama-
zon is suspicious to start with. However, given the amount
of interest received in terms of traffic and the fact that there
were some (potentially manual) logins, we think that using
IPs belonging to cloud services might not be considered sus-
picious to a wide range of attackers. Indeed, the fact that
most of our wormholes are classified as not Honeypots by
Shodan’s Honeyscore (score of 0.0), preliminarily indicates
that our setting appears to be realistic from a technical point
of view.
Incidentally we notice at least other 6 cloud instances ex-
posing cameras to Shodan. All of those instances had a
Honeypot score of 0.5, which in principle makes them more
suspicious than our set-up, but indicates potentially that ei-
ther such a setting is not uncommon (if not honeypot), or
that other people have been less stealthy in their Honeypot
setup than us.
6. RELATED WORK
Honeypots are a common measure to understand attacker
activities in computer networks. The authors of [13] provide
a taxonomy of honeypots, and differentiate between low and
high interaction honeypots. Both low and high interaction
honeypots are compared in [7], and the authors conclude
that high interaction honeypots provide more insights on
attacker behavior than low interaction ones.
The Honeynet Project [34] is a well-established project
that focuses on monitoring and analyzing attacks to com-
plement intrusion detection tools. The Honeynet project
does not use emulation, and instead leverages real systems
and applications. For that reason, the Honeynet project is
an example of high interaction honeypots.
In [15], the authors describe honeynets that can be used
to increase security in a large computer network. In short,
honeynets are clusters of honeypots.
A low interaction honeypot system is implemented in [22].
The honeypot monitors behaviors and learns the advanced
attacks that may not be detected by IDS tools. The session
of the attacker is redirected to the honeypot system, which
then serves requests from the attacker. For that purpose, the
authors provided service daemons and a fake shell so that
the attacker is not able to discover the system as honeypot.
In [4], the DecoyPort system was proposed which redirects
attackers towards honeypots. The system creates Decoy-
Ports on active computers, those ports are not used by real
services. Whenever any query or request comes to the ports,
the system diverts the same to the honeypot. The system
does not only act as a port forwarder but also is capable
of controlling network loads caused by attackers. With this
high interaction honeypot deployment, authors noted that
possibility of attack may increase.
In [11], the authors described the implementation and de-
ployment of a honeypot based on a number of real, vulner-
able web applications. They hosted all the web applications
in seven isolated virtual machines running on a VMWare
Server. In order to limit the attack surface, the authors let
the exposed services run as a non privileged user. They then
analyzed the collected data to study attackers’ behavior on
the web applications during pre and post exploitation. In
contrast, we work with real physical IoT devices to set up a
high-interaction honeypot.
Among the related work on general honeypots, we found
only one that focuses on IoT [27]. In that work, the au-
thors present a low interaction honeypot for IP cameras and
Digital Video Recorders (DVR). The authors emulated Tel-
net services for those devices. No real devices were used to
deploy the honeypot. The authors’ goal was to capture tel-
net based attacks and analyze the same with respect to the
concerned IoT devices.
Another interesting aspect has been described in [29]. The
authors discuss the necessity of deploying distributed hon-
eypots for monitoring local trends of attack and location
specific attack behavior. The authors deployed low inter-
action honeypots in different countries with active partici-
pation from various academic, industrial and governmental
organizations. These honeypots emulate various operating
systems. The authors have shown the similarities and dif-
ferences in attacks on honeypots in different locations.
A game theoretic model has been proposed in [28]. That
paper models a scenario when an attacker decides which
server to attack in a network. The authors describe a hon-
eypot selection game which will lure attackers to attack a
honeypot instead of an actual server. They studied and an-
alyzed attacker behavior empirically. They have shown that
in addition to honeypot design, the strategies should also be
emphasized.
Another recent paper [24] proposes a Bayesian game to
defend against attacks in a honeypot enabled IoT network.
In that paper, various game scenarios are described depend-
ing on the changing strategies of both the attacker and de-
fender. The authors perform systematic mathematical anal-
ysis of the games and evaluate the Bayesian model through
simulation.
Compared to existing literature, our work focuses on a
high interaction distributed honeypot consisting of real IoT
devices. That setup allows to capture and analyze real traf-
fic and attacks across different geolocations and measure at-
tacker behavior with respect to different locations. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose and im-
plement such an architecture.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a design for a distributed
and scalable high-interaction IoT honeypot. This design al-
lows portraying physical IoT devices in a single lab as being
geographically distributed by establishing tunnels between
the public IP addresses and the physical devices. It also al-
lows to collect traffic for further processing and analysis. We
have implemented a prototype of this design using five IP
cameras, one NVR, making available 85 IoT devices to the
attackers worldwide. Our implementation has allowed us to
gather several GBs of traffic data that we have preliminary
analyzed particularly from the point of view of locations
with higher attractiveness to the attacker.
In the data gathered we have particularly noticed more
than 400 brute force attempts to bypass the authentication
of our devices that have led to 42 successful logins into the
devices. We have observed an overwhelming amount of traf-
fic to our devices but comparatively not so many interactions
with the device’s web interface. We conjecture that this
is due to little automation in attack tools to perform such
attacks, and comparatively less amount of manual attacks
compared to automated attacks. Among all the deployed
devices, one particular model of DLink camera got around
60% of the total traffic, which we conjecture is due to re-
cently published vulnerabilities for this model. Devices in
Frankfurt and Singapore, attracted the highest amount of
traffic, confirming our hypothesis that location matters.
We have inducted other IoT devices like IP printer into
the high interaction honeypot and tried to understand at-
tackers’ interaction. Moreover, we also deployed a low in-
teraction honeypot using IP camera emulators to compare
attackers’ behavior with that of a high interaction honey-
pot. We observed that attackers are more interested in real
IP cameras than emulators or other devices.
In the future, we plan to add more devices to our Hon-
eypot, such as home appliances. We also plan to perform
analysis in more depth with the collected data as well as
to share our data with other researchers interested in per-
forming such analyses. Apart from this, we shall incorporate
intrusion prevention system to prevent substantial damage
to our devices. Besides, we plan to integrate the SIPHON
framework with the IoT testbed presented in [33]. By incor-
porating SIPHON with the IoT testbed, we aim at achieving
the following two goals. First, we can use the SIPHON as
one of the security testing mechanisms of the IoT testbed.
This can be achieved by exposing any IoT device that in
tested in the testbed to the Internet via the SIPHON frame-
work as a honeypot, and by using the measurement (mon-
itoring) modules in the testbed we can detect attacks orig-
inating from the Internet and potential weaknesses of the
IoT device. Secondly, we can use the IoT testbed as part of
the SIPHON mechanism. By placing an IoT device in the
testbed, we can use the stimulation modules of the testbed
for increasing the reliability of the SIPHON honeypot. For
example, we can send various GPS locations using the GPS
spoofer, simulate a network to which the IoT is connected
or simulate user activity with the honeypot.
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